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The handling of evidence in national and
local policy making: a case study of alcohol
industry actor strategies regarding data on
on-premise trading hours and violence in
Norway
Ingeborg Rossow1* and Jim McCambridge2
Abstract
Background: Effective alcohol policy measures conflict with the interests of the alcohol industry. In this study we
addressed how various alcohol industry actors in Norway have responded to research findings and police data
relating to the possible impacts of changes in on-premise trading hours on violent offending.
Methods: A content analysis of documents was undertaken. The documents comprised i) hearing statements from
policy processes on on-premise trading hours at the national level, and in 15 Norwegian cities, and ii) newspaper
articles and other media coverage of this topic in Norway.
Results: Alcohol industry actors employed a range of strategies to shape the use of evidence regarding on-premise
trading hours and violence. Nationally, the relevance of the international research literature was questioned before
the publication of an unfavourable national study which was criticized directly. This led to commissioned attacks on
the findings, constructing what were claimed to be disagreements between experts, emphasis on the complexity
of violence and the role of confounding variables, and deflecting attention to alternative interventions. The
handling of evidence at the local level was importantly different, where different industry actors and forms of
evidence, notably police data, were involved in debates.
Conclusion: Alcohol industry actors employed various strategies to shape perceptions and use of evidence to
advance their interests. The particular strategies and arguments changed over time as new data and research
became available, and also varied between the national and the local levels, and by categories of industry actors.
Keywords: Alcohol industry, Alcohol policy, Evidence, Content analysis
Background
Alcohol use is among the leading causes of disease bur-
den globally [1]. Alcohol control policies can regulate
the economic and physical availability of alcohol, impact
on alcohol sales, alcohol consumption and alcohol re-
lated harm [2, 3]. Thus, using effective alcohol policy
measures to curb sales and consumption may on the
one hand reduce alcohol related health and social
problems, and on the other hand, compromise the eco-
nomic interests involved in the production and sale of
alcoholic beverages. This illustrates an inherent conflict
of interests between public health and the alcohol indus-
try. Similar conflicts of interests are found in many other
areas, including tobacco, gambling, food, and environ-
mental pollution [4–6].
Examining both alcohol producers and other indus-
tries, Jahiel and Babor [4] identify common patterns in
how industrial corporations respond to perceived threats
to commercial activities linked to health problems: ran-
ging from silence about a health problem linked to a
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product to the commissioning of industry-funded re-
search to cast doubt on scientific findings. The literature
on tobacco industry activities regarding evidence shaping
has identified a number of strategies including: funding
research and paying scientists as advisors or spokesper-
sons, cherry picking of data that favours the industry,
criticizing evidence and emphasizing its complexity and
uncertainty, and emphasizing disagreement among sci-
entists and focusing on doubt in science [7, 8]. The latter
is well illustrated by Oreskes and Conway [9] and Mi-
chaels [10], who showed how the tobacco companies
have used scientists to instil doubt about research find-
ings linking tobacco use to lung cancer and other health
harms. Subsequently, the energy industry is known to
have extensively funded research casting doubt about
human actions that have caused global warming in a
similar manner, and involving some of the same key in-
dividuals [9]. McGarity and Wagner [11] identified six
types of strategies employed by advocates of various in-
dustries, including the tobacco, food and energy indus-
tries, to ‘bend science’ to protect their economic
interests at the expense of public health interests. These
strategies are similar to, though arguably offer a more
comprehensive framework than the abovementioned
strategies, and they are briefly summarized in Table 1.
Whether the alcohol industry has played a similar role
with respect to research on effective alcohol policy mea-
sures is less well studied. Bakke and Endal [12] found in
four sub-Saharan African countries that the alcohol in-
dustry had produced early drafts of national alcohol pol-
icy documents that ignored the international scientific
literature on the effectiveness of price and availability
measures. Babor [13] reported three examples where sci-
entists had been paid, or offered payment, by the indus-
try for attacking research on alcohol control policies.
Petticrew and colleagues [14] and McCambridge et al.
[15], identified the conduct of weak evaluation studies as
a basis for exaggerated claims about the effectiveness of
community alcohol partnerships involving industry ac-
tors. The latter study also identified serious misrepresen-
tations of the scientific literature in attempts to
influence national policy in Scotland. A recent system-
atic review of alcohol industry involvement in policy
making identified that industry actors “fund or dissemin-
ate policy relevant research with supportive findings to
create a separate, circumscribed and self-referential lit-
erature using think-tanks, academics, consultancies and
similar policy actors” in order to influence policy [16]. A
related systematic review on alcohol industry involve-
ment in science drew attention to legitimation and pub-
lic relations benefits [17]. This review identified
instrumental management of research for the purposes
of policy influence by industry actors, and longstanding
and unresolved concerns about the activities of organisa-
tions funded by the global alcohol producers in particu-
lar. How alcohol industry actors respond to research on
alcohol policy measures whose findings are in conflict
with industry interests is thus one strand of an emerging
literature on the use of evidence in alcohol policy
making.
In Norway, local authorities (at the municipality level)
decide on licenses for off-premise and on-premise alco-
hol sales and thus on outlet density and trading hours,
within nationally determined parameters. Every 4 years,
Table 1 Strategies for bending science: categories and examples
Overview of strategies for bending science: Categories and examplesa
Shaping science: Creating research to fit one’s needs; e.g. manipulating study design, research
data and methods
Hiding science: Concealing unwelcome information, e.g. pharmaceutical industry hiding results
from own research, demonstrating adverse effects of their products
Attacking science: These strategies are often in terms of ‘post-publication damage control’,
particularly targeting policy-makers and the public, attacking study methods
creating doubt about study validity:
a) Turning reliable research into ‘junk’; e.g. claim research as ‘fatally flawed’
based on limited scientific grounds and voiced by hired experts
b) illegitimate obfuscatory attacks; e.g. raising hypothetical charges about
research design that are not supportable and not easily refuted;
c) unbalanced attacks; e.g. allied attack where third parties without industry
connection (think tanks) are engaged on the industry friendly side.
Harrassing scientists a) Challenge integrity of researchers, e.g. as publicized attacks
b) Draining resources through lawsuits or unreasonable and
burdensome demands for data and documents
Packaging science Assembling expert group to advance favoured outcome, e.g. by
commissioning publications summarizing the state of science,
which ignores or belittles unwelcome research.
Spinning science Manipulating public perceptions about credible science, e.g.
campaigns to generate pressure on decision-makers to discount it.
aBased on McGarity and Wagner, 2008: Bending science. How special interests corrupt public health research
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each city/municipality council is expected to review the
local alcohol action plan, which includes regulations on
alcohol outlet density and trading hours. This permits
‘the policy window’ for local alcohol policy changes to
open regularly [18, 19].The issue of on-premise closing
hours is prominent in media attention, policy hearing
statements and other involvements of various stake-
holders in the policy making processes [18]. The nation-
ally determined parameters for trading hours are stated
in the Alcohol Act, and changes to this act can be made
as a result of a process including a reasoned proposal
and review of hearing statements from various parties
that may be affected. Such a process occurred in 2009–
2012. We therefore investigated on-premise closing
hours as an illustrative case study of the dynamics of evi-
dence use in alcohol policy – both at the national and at
the local level – with particular attention to industry ac-
tors in the present study.
A key feature of the public debates on on-premise
trading hours in Norway is the possible impacts of trad-
ing hours on violence. In September 2009, the Ministry
of Health and Care proposed, among a number of
changes to the Alcohol Act, that the national
on-premise latest permitted trading hours (hereafter
“closing times”) were to be reduced by one hour, from
3.00 am to 2.00 am. This reflected evidence in the inter-
national research literature that earlier closing times led
to less violence [20–22], though most such evidence per-
tained to the effects of implementing larger changes (e.g.
of 2 h or more) [21, 22]. The Ministry proposal stated
that: “A review of international research shows that
changes in on-premise trading hours are accompanied
by changes in violence rates. When trading hours in-
crease, so do violence rates, and the other way around.”
[23]. The proposal was sent for consultation and a year
later, in December 2010, the Ministry concluded on the
basis of hearing statements from an exceptionally large
number and broad range of actors, that they would await
to make a decision until an ongoing Norwegian research
project examining the impact of trading hours on vio-
lence was finished [24].
The abovementioned research project was initiated
and led by the present first author and examined the
impact of restricting or extending closing times be-
tween half an hour and one and a half hours on vio-
lence rates in 18 Norwegian cities (hereafter the RN
study). Quarterly data on police reported violent as-
saults at nighttime on weekends in city centers over
a 10 year period in these cities were analyzed [25].
Assaults outside the city center during the same time
window were used as proxy for potential con-
founders. The findings were robustly established
across three different statistical modelling techniques.
In addition to the peer review process of a leading
specialist journal, three independent post-publication
assessments of the study were obtained [26]. A sub-
sequent systematic review stated: “The most compre-
hensive study of late-night trading hour changes
comes from Norway, where Rossow and Norström
examined the impact of small changes (< 2 h) in al-
lowable late-night trading for bars in 18 Norwegian
cities. They found that each 1-h change in trading
hours was associated with a change of 16% in re-
corded assaults. This is the only study to include
both extensions and restrictions on trading hours,
and the findings were similar for changes in both
directions, adding more evidence that effects were
causally related to the policy changes” [27].
The publication of this study in September 2011 was
immediately relevant to both the on-going decision-
making on national latest permitted trading hours and
for decisions at local levels in the next few months, as
most municipalities were about to revise their alcohol
action plans and thereby decide on possible changes in
local closing times. In addition to the formal research,
the local police’s own violence statistics was another key
data source for assessment of the possible impacts of
changes in on-premise closing times that was prominent
in media discussions of these issues.
Methods
In this study, we examine how various alcohol industry
actors at both the national and local level in Norway
responded to these two contrasting forms of evidence;
the research findings and the police statistics relating to
the possible impacts of changes in on-premise trading
hours on violent offending.
Three data sources were used as follows; i) policy
documents including formal hearings statements
from policy making processes at the national and the
local level; ii) Norwegian print and ether media arti-
cles; and iii) sources further identified from media
articles.
Documents from the national policy making process
were obtained from the Norwegian government’s website
(regjeringen.no), while those on local policy making pro-
cesses were obtained from the municipality web-sites for
19 of the 30 largest cities in Norway. In all 19 cities,
on-premise trading hours were on the political agenda in
the local alcohol policy making processes in 2011–2012.
Virtually all Norwegian newspapers (national, regional
and local) (n = 107) and the main radio and TV channels
(n = 7) were electronically searched in a media database
(Retriever ©) using the following search terms; ‘On-pre-
mise trading hours*’AND ‘Violence*’AND various search
terms for actors in the alcohol industry AND ‘Police*’, or
‘statistics*’, or ‘research*’, covering the period 01.01.2009
through 01.09.2012. This period was selected because the
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debates surrounding the decision making process over a
possible national restriction on maximum trading hours
started early in 2009 and the final decision was announced
in June 2012. At the local level, on-premise trading hours
were likely to be politically debated and possibly changed
in the wake of newly elected municipality councils in most
Norwegian municipalities (elections held in September
2011), i.e. within the data collection period.
Alcohol industry actors included individual owners
and managers of on-premise licenses (e.g. pubs, night-
clubs), the national and regional trade organizations in
the hospitality industry, individual alcoholic beverage
producers (e.g. breweries) and their national trade orga-
nizations, and the trade organization of wholesalers/im-
porters. Other types of commercial actors that may be
affected by on-premise trading hours changes (e.g. taxi
services and travel agencies/event agencies) were not
included.
Only material of relevance to how alcohol industry ac-
tors dealt with data on the closing times – violence asso-
ciation was included. In the media articles, data on
responses to scientific and non-scientific evidence
(police data) comprised both direct and indirect quota-
tions from alcohol industry actors and journalistic inter-
pretation of these responses when this was supported in
other parts of the article.
The media search strategy identified a total of 2825
media articles, newspaper contributions/letters to the
editor, and other media pieces. Headings and extracts
of these were all screened and approximately half
were read in full text. Altogether 56 unique media ar-
ticles (including newspaper contributions) related to
industry responses to evidence on closing times and
violence. Similar versions to those included were
identified in other media sources, and are not
counted within the 56 selected for study. In addition,
numerous media articles covered industry representa-
tives’ views on on-premise trading hours as an issue,
but did not express views on research evidence or po-
lice statistics specifically and were thus excluded.
The media data were sorted by date and categorized
by i) policy level (national vs local); ii) type of industry
actor (national/regional organization vs local individual);
and iii) type of evidence (research vs police statistics);
and iv) media reach (national vs local). Initially, we ap-
plied a summative content analysis [28] to explore
whether the two main categories of industry actors (or-
ganizations vs local individual actors) differed with re-
spect to involvement at the two policy levels, type of
evidence in focus, and appearance in local or national
media. Next, we applied a directed content analysis,
guided by previous empirical studies of industry strat-
egies to shaping evidence, employing a classification
process of coding and identification of patterns in the
text data [28]. The first author approached the data
chronologically and separately for the national and the
local policy level. The first author explored whether
there was consistency or dominance in the data both
across industry actors and over time, and whether there
was heterogeneity in these respects. The second author
discussed the analyses conducted by the first author at
various points in the process. The main data source for
these analyses was the media articles and hearing state-
ments, but the industry commissioned reports provided
some additional information.
Results
Different actors had different foci. In the media articles,
there was primarily attention to research evidence at the
national rather than the local level. The main industry
organizations were more involved with research evi-
dence and at the national level, whereas individual in-
dustry actors were more often concerned with the
evidence at the local level, where police statistics were
the predominant source of evidence discussed (Fig. 1).
Moreover, the industry organizations mainly expressed
their views in national news media with large circulation
and often as newspaper contributions, whereas individ-
ual actors, reflecting on evidence pertaining to local pol-
icy, typically expressed their views in the local media.
There was no evidence of any activities by the global
producers or their organizations.
Hearing statements from industry actors regarding
possible national restrictions (n = 10), included eight
statements referring to the evidence on trading hours
and violence. At the local level, industry actors gave
hearings statements in 9 of the 19 cities where
on-premise trading hours were on the political agenda,
and among these 9 hearing statements, a national hospi-
tality industry trade organization gave 2 statements ad-
dressing evidence on closing times and violence. In the
hearing statements, the trade organizations were
typically involved at the national level paying attention
to research evidence, whereas at the local level, there
were few hearing statements from industry actors,
concerned with research evidence (n = 1) and police
statistics (n = 2) respectively.
The two main national hospitality industry trade orga-
nizations, NHO Reiseliv and Virke (formerly HSH), each
commissioned reports on violence in relation to
on-premise trading during the autumn 2011/winter
2012. These reports were both concerned with the pos-
sible national restrictions.
International research evidence use in responses to the
proposed national restrictions on closing times
Various industry actors provided hearing statements,
representing the hospitality industry trade organizations,
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the breweries’ organization, the wine and liquor whole-
salers and importers’ organization, the groceries’ whole-
salers’ organization, and a few individual actors in the
hospitality industry, and all argued strongly against the
proposal. The policy arguments included: expected eco-
nomic losses for the hospitality industry; the municipal-
ities’ right to decide on local policy; and that other
strategies would be better suited to curb violence and
nuisance. A prominent argument was the lack of sufficient
evidence, particularly in the Norwegian context. In eight
of 10 statements, the evidence, as presented by the Minis-
try in their proposal, was criticized and refuted. Several
statements were quite lengthy and paid substantial atten-
tion to this issue, particularly the statements from the lar-
ger organizations. Some actors simply stated that there
was no evidence, whereas others conveyed a more detailed
critique, and it was argued that evidence from the inter-
national literature was of little or no relevance in the Nor-
wegian context, as the empirical studies pertained to
larger changes in trading hours and/or came from other
countries.
“There is not a single research report in the entire world
concluding that a small restriction in trading hours will
lead to less violence” (Pub consortium, Bergen).
“The international research [ ] is in no way relevant in
the debate of a one hour restriction.” (Utelivsbransjen,
an organization of dance and music venues)
At this time, these claims were, in one sense, largely
in line with international reviews of the literature,
which mainly showed harmful effects of large exten-
sions of trading hours and few studies with
inconsistent findings examining smaller changes in
trading hours [20–22].
The proportion of total alcohol volume being con-
sumed on-premise was emphasized in several state-
ments, the argument being that any changes in this
small volume was unlikely to impact on violence rates.
Moreover, the complexity of the problem at hand was
also noted by one actor, who claimed this meant a differ-
ent approach was needed.
“Harms from alcohol are a far more complex issue
than the result of extended trading hours to 3.00 am.
Complex issues demand complex solutions” (HSH, a
national hospitality industry trade organization).
There are some examples that industry actors had
searched for alternative expert opinion so as to cherry
pick statements from researchers or research publica-
tions in support of their view.
“Violence researcher [named] does not believe trading
hours and universal prevention measures are of any
importance.” (Pub consortium owner, Bergen).
Industry actors chose carefully which evidence to contest;
although industry actors denied the existence of research
evidence of an impact of trading hours on violence, the
evidence of an overall association between alcohol con-
sumption and violence was acknowledged. Industry actors
were often rhetorically explicit in welcoming further re-
search on this issue, thus not challenging the potential
value of research evidence per se. Moreover, in several
hearings statements, particularly those from the larger or-
ganizations, the actors portrayed themselves as serious
Fig. 1 Count of media articles by industry actor types and levels of policy making
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and responsible, sharing the concern with the problem of
violence in the night time economy, and being eager to
find solutions.
In November 2010, when the Ministry of Health and
Care announced their decision to delay national restric-
tions until they had Norwegian research evidence, indus-
try actors expressed unanimous appreciation of the
decision and repeated their views on the international
evidence.
“We have persistently noted the lack of sufficient
evidence on the association between trading hours
and violence. […] The Government deserves praise
for having reached a responsible decision.” (NHO
Reiseliv, hospitality industry trade organization,
November 25, 2010).
National research evidence use in responses to the
proposed national restrictions on closing times
Less than 1 year later, the RN study [25] was pub-
lished, and first reached public attention in Norway
on September 29, 2011 with front page coverage in a
national newspaper. In the following weeks, NHO
Reiseliv was prominent in the responses by industry
actors. Their immediate response, on the same day,
was that the issue was more complex than suggested
and that the study had “omitted taking other factors,
including police on the streets and public transporta-
tion, into consideration”.
Three days later, NHO Reiseliv nuanced and strength-
ened their critique by referring to a short manuscript,
which they had commissioned from a private consult-
ancy firm (Menon Business Economics). The manu-
script, assessing the RN study, was leaked to the media
and its main points conveyed via media interviews with
NHO Reiseliv. The headline of the 1.5 page manuscript
was “Large and important weaknesses in the [RN study]
report”, a phrase that was repeatedly echoed by NHO
Reiseliv and other hospitality industry representatives in
the media. The main critique pertained to the methods
employed in the RN study and claimed lack of control
for other factors impacting on violence. The manuscript
was later included as an appendix in a report from
Menon Business Economics, also commissioned by
NHO Reiseliv, which reviewed literature and Norwegian
data related to on-premise trading hours, alcohol con-
sumption and violence including the RN study [29].
NHO Reiseliv emphasized that the critique of the RN
study, as if this had been convincingly demonstrated,
meant there was an absence of evidence to support re-
stricted trading hours.
“Now that large and important weaknesses of the [RN]
study have been revealed, it is impossible for policy
makers to adopt restricted trading hours.” (NHO
Reiseliv, October 1, 2011).
The industry commissioned critique of the RN study
gained support from a local level politician, who offered
similar critical remarks in newspaper interviews. He
elaborated these remarks and wrote a blog post on a
right wing liberal think tank website [30] . Statements
from the blog post attacking the science and devaluing
its value for policy, like “Useless report about on-premise
trading hours” and “the findings are useless for politi-
cians” were frequently repeated by hospitality industry
actors. Holding a PhD in meta-analysis of British gov-
ernment support, this politician was regarded by several
journalists, and claimed by industry actors, to be an ex-
pert. Some commentators noted that the politician likely
had an underlying political agenda, as he and his party
were strongly in favour of extended trading hours.
Nevertheless his critique fueled the media’s attention to
what was now being construed as a disagreement be-
tween experts, and resulted in newspaper headlines like
“Strong fight between experts” (Dagbladet (a national
newspaper), October 6, 2011). This framing was also con-
veyed by industry actors in media interviews. Referring
to the local politician’s blog post and to the authors of
the commissioned review of the RN study, NHO Reiseliv
emphasised what was presented as a convergence of ex-
pert opinion as follows.
“Two other experts, independent of each other, have now
found that there are large and important weaknesses of
the [RN] study.” (NHO Reiseliv, October 6, 2011).
The authors of the RN study (including the present
first author) noted publicly that factors other than trad-
ing hours may also impact on violence rates, whilst
defending the methods and study findings [31]. In a
newspaper interview, NHO Reiseliv responded by stat-
ing: “This confirms what we’ve been saying all the time,
the issue is more complex than what the researchers
claim. Now it seems that the researchers admit we were
right in our critique” (October 22, 2011).
Beyond attacking the science, another kind of critique
pertained to research integrity and possible political ma-
nipulation of the research process. NHO Reiseliv claimed
that the Minister of Health, being in charge of the re-
search institute where the RN study was conducted, had
been “lucky to receive a conclusion she wanted” (as de-
scribed in a national newspaper editorial, September 30,
2011). In several debates on TV, this trade organization
referred to the RN study in ways suggesting that the re-
searchers served a political agenda. Thus not only was the
integrity of the scientists attacked, the national politicians
involved were also attacked.
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The issue of credibility of the science and the scientists
was linked to that of complexity, which was repeatedly
brought up by NHO Reiseliv and other hospitality indus-
try representatives, suggesting that it was unlikely that
there could exist policy measures with the effects ob-
served in the research.
“We do not believe the world is so simple that violence
is reduced by almost 20% if closing hours are
restricted by one hour. A number of other factors
impact on violence.” (NHO Reiseliv, October 20, 2011).
In February 2012, the other large national hospitality
industry trade organization (Virke, formerly called HSH)
and a regional trade union for servers published a re-
port, which is likely commissioned work from a consult-
ancy firm [32]. This report reviewed briefly the
international literature and it repeated the previously
published critique by the local politician on the RN
study, paying particular attention to alleged methodo-
logical weaknesses. The report concluded that the scien-
tific evidence for impact of small changes in on-premise
trading hours was weak and inconclusive and a number
of other strategies to combat violence related to
on-premise drinking were suggested.
“Both Norwegian and international research
demonstrate large uncertainty regarding the
association between on-premise trading hours and vio-
lence, and especially when the regulation is less than
two hours.” (Joint report from Virke and Oslo Server
Union, February, 2012).
The launch of this report received much media at-
tention and further strengthened the voices calling for
approaches other than earlier closing times, including
having police dogs at bar entrances and offering free
coffee when alcohol serving was finished. Such mea-
sures have no foundation in any evidence-base. Thus,
over a 5 month period after the RN-study was pub-
lished, the hospitality industry had commissioned two
reports on on-premise trading hours and violence in-
cluding a specific critique of the RN study and given
numerous media interviews on this issue (n = 24). The
arguments were no longer that evidence was lacking,
but that the Norwegian research showing an impact
of closing hours was methodologically flawed and that
the researchers had a political agenda. Furthermore, it
was asserted that Norwegian experts in the field dis-
agreed, and that the problem of violence was much
more complex than suggested by an implausibly sim-
ple solution of restricted closing hours (see Table 2).
Unevidenced alternatives were promoted instead.
Up to early June 2012, just before the Norwegian
Government was expected to finally decide whether
or not to restrict the national latest permitted closing
time from 3.00 am to 2.00 am, the wine and spirits
importers’ association and NHO Reiseliv were in-
volved in lobbying, as reported in the media. In one
national newspaper article, representatives of both
these organizations confirmed lobbying or “spreading
information in society” by means of meetings with
politicians, media reports, websites and multiple
newspaper contributions and media interviews. Our
data comprise only the latter two sources.
Table 2 Overview of handling of evidence by the industry observed in the present study
Strategies for bending sciencea Any evidence in present study?
Shaping science No
Hiding science No
Attacking science: Yes
a) Claim research as ‘fatally flawed’ based on limited scientific
grounds and voiced by hired experts
b) Illegitimate obfuscatory attacks
c) Allied attack where third parties without industry connection
(think tanks) are engaged on the industry friendly side.
a) Industry commissioned reports characterized the RN-study as having
‘large and important weaknesses’
b) Cherry picking data, selecting anecdotal evidence supporting the
industry’s views
c) RN-study criticized by liberal politician in think-tank website
Harrassing scientists
a) Challenge integrity of researchers, e.g. as publicized attacks
Yes (not B, see Table 1)
a) RN-study researchers accused of lip-serving the Minister of Health.
(The police were also accused of manipulating routine data).
Packaging science Yes
Commissioning publications summarizing the state of science,
which ignores or belittles unwelcome research.
The hospitality industry commissioned two reports; both ignoring or belittling
unfavourable evidence.
Spinning science Yes
Manipulating public perceptions about credible science,
framing the issue
Systematic framing in media: - of research evidence as flawed and therefore to be
discounted in the policy-making; − constructing disagreement between “experts”;
− emphasizing the complexity of violence and alternative ways to curb violence
aBased on McGarity and Wagner, 2008: Bending science. How special interests corrupt public health research
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“There is no factual evidence for the claim that
closing earlier will lead to fewer violence incidents.
However, there is reason to believe that many
different efforts will lead to a reduction in violence
and nuisance” (the Norwegian wine and spirits
importers’ association, newspaper contribution to 5
national newspapers, June 2012)
In late June 2012, the Norwegian government
launched a white paper on alcohol and drug policy,
which stated that the national maximum trading hours
(3.00 am) were to be kept as they were. The Minister of
Health made little comment on this, beyond stating
that over-serving was the big problem and that the re-
quirements for local control of bars and pubs were to
be stricter.
Evidence use in local policy making processes
In many Norwegian cities, the question of whether or
not to restrict local closing times was being debated,
alongside the national decision making process. Com-
pared to the debate at the national level, as described
above, a broader range of actors were involved in the
local debates and local policy processes. These included
individual bar owners/managers, local trade organiza-
tions and a local brewery, in addition to the national and
regional trade organizations.
In the local debates, bar and pub owners rejected re-
search on trading hours and violence, but mainly by stat-
ing mere disbelief in the findings. However, a local
brewery referred to one of the industry commissioned lit-
erature reviews [32] in their hearing statement and stated
that “given the lack of scientific evidence for the effects of
the proposed restriction, we ask that the current trading
hours are continued.” In a hearing statement requesting
extended trading hours in one city, the regional hospitality
industry trade organization (NHO/NiT) used a similar ar-
gument: “there is no valid evidence that restricted trading
hours has led to less violence”. They further argued that
use of both available research and the police statistics had
not taken into account other factors that may have im-
pacted on violence rates. A similar argument was used by
a local brewery in their hearing statement responding to a
proposed restriction of closing time.
This focus on police statistics on violence was much
more prominent at the local than at the national level
(see Fig. 1). In many cities, the police referred to their
own statistics when they argued strongly for a restriction
of trading hours. The industry actors argued unani-
mously and strongly against this measure, using various
lines of arguments that have clear similarities with those
on scientific research evidence. First, in their response to
the police and others, who argued that restricted trading
hours had led to fewer police reported assaults, several
industry actors questioned the validity of police statistics
on violence, for instance claiming that the violence sta-
tistics presented by the police do not reflect the real
trends in violence, and also that a number of other fac-
tors than trading hours have impacted on the local vio-
lence statistics..
“Is it really a true decrease in violence in [city], and
what is the true cause of the decrease? This can only be
discussed when we have access to – and can perform
independent analyses of – the real data. However, the
police refuses to publish these data.” (Nine individual
hospitality industry representatives, in a common
opinion piece to a local newspaper, January, 2010).
Several actors, both among the individual bar owners
and among the hospitality industry trade organizations,
claimed that the police exaggerated the violence
problem.
“There is not as much trouble around bars and pubs
as the police claim.” (SH, former night club owner and
conservative local politician, January 16, 2012).
Some also accused the police of manipulating their
data or their presentation of the police statistics. The
similarities with tactics used in critiques of the research
at the national level, thus extended also to attacking the
integrity of those providing the evidence.
“The police only uses the data that support their own
views, which leads to a biased presentation.[ ] I
suspect that the police both over-report and under-
report in order to obtain a desired basis for their rec-
ommendations to the policy makers.” (MM, Bar man-
ager, June 26, 2011).
Cherry picking of evidence was also seen among in-
dustry actors at the local level. Some referred to experi-
ences in other cities or regions, suggesting that trading
hours had no impact on violence, or even the opposite
effect, thereby selecting anecdotal evidence to support
their views.
Others refuted any impact of restricted trading hours
by dismissing alcohol serving as the source of the prob-
lem, and they claimed that violence and nuisance were
often attributable to drugs rather than alcohol, or that
drinking prior to going to bars was the cause of late
night violence in the city centres rather than on-premise
drinking.
“Many of those who cause trouble, have something quite
different than alcohol in their blood, and we do not have
powder in our taps.” (AK, bar owner, July 18, 2012).
Rossow and McCambridge BMC Public Health           (2019) 19:44 Page 8 of 12
“Are we [who work] in the night time economy
business responsible for violence, given that only a
small fraction of the alcohol is sold by us? [ ] We
experience that people drink a lot before going to the
city centre.” (HCS, pub owner, April 24, 2012).
Overall, the industry trade organizations were less
prominent in debates at the local level as compared
to the debate on national restrictions. At the local
level, individual bar and pub owners and their local
associations were more prominent. The trade organi-
zations’ arguments at the local level reflected those
used in the national debate, although in this context,
they emphasized to a larger extent the importance of
the local authorities’ capacity to assess and decide on
local matters. The individual bar and pub owners
responded more often to local police statistics than to
research on trading hours and violence and in doing
so, they sometimes cherry picked examples to illus-
trate their points of view.
The trade organizations had sufficient resources to
prepare, nuance and substantiate their arguments on
evidence and also to convey them through more numer-
ous and more significant channels than local actors.
Other actors did also use the phrases and arguments
already produced by the trade organization actors. But,
rather than providing a mere echo, they often presented
their arguments along with their own personal testi-
monies of knowledge of the business and the problem at
hand, which may have strengthened credibility. In the
two cities where industry actors claimed lack of evidence
on closing hours and violence in their hearing state-
ments, the political decisions differed; in one city the
proposed restriction was not adopted, and in the other
city, restricted closing time was continued.
Discussion
Industry actors employed various strategies to shape per-
ceptions of evidence by conveying their preferred inter-
pretations regarding on-premise trading hours and
violence. The relevance of the international research lit-
erature to the impacts of smaller changes to closing
times was questioned first at the national level. After the
publication of evidence demonstrating impacts of such
changes in Norway, industry actors attacked the study
and systematically cast doubt on the evidence, employ-
ing a range of strategies which are used by industry ac-
tors in other areas [11] (see Table 2 for a summary). At
the local level, industry actors criticized both research
evidence and police statistics, but they were less versatile
in their ways of criticizing evidence, and police statistics
were much more important than research evidence in
the local debates. Both in the hearings statements in pol-
icy making processes and in media articles, we find that
the larger organizations typically were better resourced
and more sophisticated in their shaping of the evidence,
as compared to the individual actors and local organiza-
tions. Alcohol industry actors repeated the same or simi-
lar arguments recurrently in different media interviews
and newspaper contributions, even using identical
phrases. Many of the key phrases and arguments
originated in the two reports commissioned by the trade
organizations. On several occasions, industry representa-
tives published the same opinion piece in several differ-
ent national and regional newspapers, or press releases
were simply reproduced without editing.
In line with the existing research literature on industry
tactics to shape perceptions of available evidence (see
[33] for tobacco industry) we also found commissioning
of attacks critiquing the research, emphasizing disagree-
ments among experts, in this case constructing the sta-
tus of expert to mean informed opinion, and not
referring to scientific debates, focusing on doubt, com-
plexity, and confounding; and cherry picking of data. In
addition to attacking the evidence directly, we found at-
tacks on the researchers and police integrity, a strategy
which has also been used by for instance the food indus-
try and the tobacco industry, when claiming that re-
searchers had a political agenda [34, 35].
There has been limited prior study of how alcohol in-
dustry actors shape evidence potentially harmful to the
industry in the processes of policy making [16, 17]. Alco-
hol industry actors routinely claim to be committed to
evidence informed policy, yet consistently misrepresent
evidence, apparently because they oppose the market
regulatory approaches which evidence shows are most
likely to be effective [15]. Doubt about evidence inter-
feres with evidence use by policy makers, and this is a
key feature of the existing research in this area. Studies
suggest that the extent to which scientific evidence has
been used in policy making may be pivotal in explaining
the divergence in national alcohol policy between Eng-
land and Scotland for example [15, 36]. The importance
of the framing of alcohol policy evidence in line with
policy preferences has been examined in existing studies,
particularly in respect of the political strategies of the
global producers [16, 37]. Here we find national level
trade organisations using similar approaches to framing
research evidence, after initially discounting the rele-
vance of the international literature.
Study limitations are several. First, alcohol industry ac-
tors have clearly responded through a broader range of
channels than those covered by our data set, including
TV debates and interviews, and directly lobbying politi-
cians and other policy actors. Second, many industry ac-
tors may have chosen, as a deliberate strategy, to ignore
research/police statistics and this kind of strategy could
not be revealed in our data set, which concerns what
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was done rather than what was not done. Thus, the full
range of strategies in the handling of evidence employed
by industry actors likely exceed those identified in the
present study. Finally, the question as to whether, or to
what extent, the shaping of evidence through industry
activities made an impact in the policy making processes
at the national and local levels, lies beyond the scope of
the present study. The use of research based knowledge
and other evidence of the effects of policy measures is
far from simple and solely instrumental in policy making
processes, it is also the subject of, and reflects the bal-
ance of forces in, political contestation [38–41].
The present study contributes to the existing evidence
base specifically on alcohol industry actors by drawing
attention to the ways in which strategic approaches to
evidence management vary flexibly over time as the evi-
dence itself changes, and as do the policy circumstances.
The circumstances of this study are of a policy contro-
versy operating contemporaneously at both national and
local levels where scientific evidence published by the
first author was a high profile feature of the debate. Other
policy debates may involve scientific and other forms of
evidence in less prominent ways. The handling of evidence
studied here is one component of higher level political
strategies which frame the issues with which policy mak-
ing contends in ways favourable to industry interests so as
to defeat unfavoured proposals, such as this one [16]. This
framing activity was here led by trade organisations as
there are no dedicated social aspects organizations in
Norway, as there are in other countries [42]. In other
countries this political function is performed by social as-
pects organizations where they exist [37]. There are also
major differences in cultures of evidence use at the local
and national level [43], with local data sources and actor
types more prominent in the former, a high level of organ-
isation and co-ordination in the latter, and some evidence
of interplay between the two in this instance.
As part of the research process, researchers get involved
in research dissemination, knowledge exchange and vari-
ous aspects of policy making. This study demonstrates
that, notwithstanding reflexivity considerations, there is
important value in not only observing and promoting the
use of research evidence in policy making, but in also
studying it. Alcohol policy researchers are well placed to
identify misuses of evidence in the strategic management
of research by industry actors and other vested interests.
They are thus well placed to assist policy actors. Alcohol
industry actors rhetorically distance themselves from to-
bacco industry actors in their efforts to influence policy,
which have otherwise shared obvious similarities [16, 44],
notwithstanding cross-ownership [45]. National govern-
ments and other public health policy actors will benefit
from paying close attention to the similarities between
these two categories [46, 47], and researchers can
contribute by furthering understanding of the similarities
and differences. Further study of industry actor policy in-
volvement, specifically including use of evidence therein,
is an important aspect to developing public health coun-
termeasures to alcohol industry influence on policy [48].
Conclusion
Alcohol industry actors employed a range of strategies
to shape the use of the various types of evidence on
on-premise trading hours and violence to advance
their own interests. The particular strategies and ar-
guments changed over time as new data and research
became available, and also varied between the na-
tional and the local levels and by categories of indus-
try actors. There is a need to better understand how
the handling of different forms of evidence is accom-
modated within the political strategies of a range of
industry actors in respect of particular policy issues
and forms of evidence, at different levels of policy
making and in varying policy contexts.
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